Cernig at Crooks and Liars has an excellent post on the economic incentives that are available to Iran (or the many countries actively producing enriched uranium now).  He takes a very fair and even approach to the subject, which has received very little open discussion in the press (I don’t consider discussion open if it must arrive at the conclusion that Iran is building nuclear weapons to attack Israel) and Cernig manages to avoid making any assertions to true motives by the authorities in Iran.  He does make some conclusions about American motives, however, but they seem quite reasonable in the light of the evidence he provides (America’s attempt to have private companies control the sale of enriched uranium) and what we know about the Bush administrations ideology.

I believe he is correct in the phrasing of the situation and arrives at a very practical conclusion with reasonable international demands and Iranian demands in mind.  He acknowledges that the economic incentives for uranium enrichment are substantial even without the military component, thereby making any international claim to halt Iranian enrichment entirely illegitimate.  Instead he returns to the practical bargain that would allow for continued trade of nuclear fuel while opening participating nations to regulation and monitoring.

When it comes to nuclear energy, it cannot be underlooked that there are more prosaic (and more profitable) uses than those of destruction.  When it cannot be proven, or has not been proven, that a nation is engaging in nuclear bomb production (which is a very legitimate goal for a nation as well, especially one being regularly threatened with destruction and regime change, but that is another argument…), we must have some threshold of proof.  When active investigation does not come to a certain conclusion (many would argue that the conclusion is definitively that Iran has not restarted its weapons program), it seems only reasonable to provide an opportunity for the nation to clarify it’s intent.

By opening the nation to monitored trade of fissile materials, we effectively provide the opportunity for Iran to reveal its intentions, and further engage in the international community.

When a nation is labelled, rightfully or wrongfully, as ‘the enemy’, it is only sensible to prepare for the worst (a nuclear bomb).  However there is no reason to force more nations into the league of ‘the enemy’ than is necessary.  By ascertaining Iran’s intentions, we can reduce the risk of adding one more nation to the growing number of those that hate America, and thereby remove one more threat (even if imagined, it would soon become real the way we treat those we suspect).

… and the cow goes moo

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